图书情报工作 ›› 2017, Vol. 61 ›› Issue (22): 45-51.DOI: 10.13266/j.issn.0252-3116.2017.22.006

• 理论研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

网络信息资源著作权风险规避中的委托代理关系

李婵1, 徐龙顺1, 张文德2   

  1. 1. 福建农林大学公共管理学院 福州 350002;
    2. 福州大学信息管理研究所/信息化建设办公室 福州 350116
  • 收稿日期:2017-05-16 修回日期:2017-07-24 出版日期:2017-11-20 发布日期:2017-11-20
  • 作者简介:李婵(ORCID:0000-0002-8591-9328),讲师,博士,硕士生导师,E-mail:shandongweifanglch@163.com;徐龙顺(ORCID:0000-0001-6954-2017),硕士研究生;张文德(ORCID:0000-0002-3017-9211),信息管理研究所所长,信息化建设办公室主任,教授,博士生导师。
  • 基金资助:
    本文系福建省社会科学青年项目"网络信息资源著作权侵权风险动态监测及动态决策研究"(项目编号:FJ2016C094)研究成果之一。

Principal-agent Relationships in Copyright Risk Avoidance of Network Information Resources

Li Chan1, Xu Longshun1, Zhang Wende2   

  1. 1. School of Public Administration, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002;
    2. Institute of Information Management/Information Construction Office, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116
  • Received:2017-05-16 Revised:2017-07-24 Online:2017-11-20 Published:2017-11-20

摘要: [目的/意义]通过对网络信息资源著作权风险中著作权人与网络服务提供者的博弈分析,在利益均衡的基础上提出著作权风险规避的策略。[方法/过程]运用委托代理理论的基本原理,分析著作权人与网络服务提供者的委托代理关系,构建信息不对称条件下著作权人为风险中性和风险规避时的委托代理模型,并进一步对两种情况下的各绩效指标进行探讨。[结果/结论]在委托代理机制下,著作权人与网络服务提供者在风险规避上的利益具有一致性;在两种不同情况下著作权人的激励程度、网络服务提供者的努力程度以及总的期望收益均有显著变化;著作权人的激励程度以及双方的最终收益与网络服务提供者的努力程度、努力成效、风险规避程度、项目完成能力等因素密切相关。基于此,可以通过健全奖惩激励机制、完善利益补偿机制、强化监督管理机制来规避网络信息资源著作权中的风险问题,实现委托代理双方收益的帕累托最优。

关键词: 网络信息资源著作权, 著作权人, 网络服务提供者, 委托代理, 风险规避

Abstract: [Purpose/significance] This article proposes some effective strategies on avoiding the copyright risks by way of analyzing game relationship between the copyright holders and network service providers.[Method/process] It uses the Principal-agent Theory to analyze the principal-agent relationship between copyright holders and network service providers. Then it builds a Risk-Neutral model and a Risk-Evasive model in the case of information asymmetry, and further researches the Performance Indicators in different situations.[Result/conclusion] The results show that the interests of copyright holder are consistent with those network service providers. In different conditions, the incentive degree of copyright holders and the struggling degree of network service providers and the total expected revenue change significantly. Furthermore, the incentive degree of copyright holders and the final interests of both are closely related to the factors of network service providers' struggling degree and efforts and so on. Therefore, the copyright risks can be avoided by the following suggestions:(i) improve the rewards and punishment incentive mechanism; (ii) perfect the benefit compensation mechanism; (iii) strengthen supervision and management mechanism.

Key words: copyright of network information resources, copyright holders, network service providers, principal-agent, risk aversion

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