Principal-agent Relationships in Copyright Risk Avoidance of Network Information Resources

  • Li Chan ,
  • Xu Longshun ,
  • Zhang Wende
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  • 1. School of Public Administration, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002;
    2. Institute of Information Management/Information Construction Office, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116

Received date: 2017-05-16

  Revised date: 2017-07-24

  Online published: 2017-11-20

Abstract

[Purpose/significance] This article proposes some effective strategies on avoiding the copyright risks by way of analyzing game relationship between the copyright holders and network service providers.[Method/process] It uses the Principal-agent Theory to analyze the principal-agent relationship between copyright holders and network service providers. Then it builds a Risk-Neutral model and a Risk-Evasive model in the case of information asymmetry, and further researches the Performance Indicators in different situations.[Result/conclusion] The results show that the interests of copyright holder are consistent with those network service providers. In different conditions, the incentive degree of copyright holders and the struggling degree of network service providers and the total expected revenue change significantly. Furthermore, the incentive degree of copyright holders and the final interests of both are closely related to the factors of network service providers' struggling degree and efforts and so on. Therefore, the copyright risks can be avoided by the following suggestions:(i) improve the rewards and punishment incentive mechanism; (ii) perfect the benefit compensation mechanism; (iii) strengthen supervision and management mechanism.

Cite this article

Li Chan , Xu Longshun , Zhang Wende . Principal-agent Relationships in Copyright Risk Avoidance of Network Information Resources[J]. Library and Information Service, 2017 , 61(22) : 45 -51 . DOI: 10.13266/j.issn.0252-3116.2017.22.006

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