[Purpose/significance] Based on the evolutionary game analysis of copyright protection, it is helpful to explore whether the original subject of digital content products has tolerance to counterfeiting behavior, and to explore the strategic choice of implementing copyright protection under different counterfeit levels. It has certain guiding significance for regulating the behavior of market participants in digital content products.[Method/process] Firstly, the evolutionary game model was used to analyze the interest evolution process of original subject and counterfeit subject, and to explore the tolerance of original subject to counterfeiting under copyright protection. Then, by refining the profit function model of both sides of the game, the determinants of the tolerance level of the original subject were explored.[Result/conclusion] The original subject has a certain degree tolerance for the lower level of counterfeiting and zero tolerance for the higher level of counterfeiting. The maximum counterfeit level tolerance is determined by four factors:the counterfeit cross profit coefficient, the income model constant coefficient, the product R&D cost coefficient and the product R&D effort multiples.
Zhao Yan
,
Wang Wenju
,
Ni Yuan
. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Copyright Protection of Digital Content Products[J]. Library and Information Service, 2019
, 63(2)
: 43
-51
.
DOI: 10.13266/j.issn.0252-3116.2019.02.005
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